Moral Uncertainty
by William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
8.26 / 10 82 ratings
- Language
- English
- Published
- 2020
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press Academic UK
- Pages
- 224
- ISBN
- 9780191033643
We often face situations where we are uncertain about the morally correct course of action, grappling with dilemmas such as weighing the interests of different beings or understanding our obligations to distant strangers. While decision-making under factual uncertainty has been thoroughly examined, the crucial question of how to make choices when confronted with fundamental moral uncertainty has remained largely unexplored. This book addresses that gap, arguing for distinct norms that should guide decisions in such ethically ambiguous circumstances.
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord present an information-sensitive framework for navigating moral uncertainty. They explore how the appropriate way to act depends on the nature of one's moral beliefs, considering whether moral theories are ordinal, cardinal, or intertheoretically comparable. The authors delve into the complex problem of making intertheoretic comparisons, offering novel solutions and discussing the implications of their views for metaethics and practical ethics. This work provides a comprehensive overview and a new theoretical framework for anyone seeking a rigorous method for ethical decision-making when moral truths are not clear.
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord present an information-sensitive framework for navigating moral uncertainty. They explore how the appropriate way to act depends on the nature of one's moral beliefs, considering whether moral theories are ordinal, cardinal, or intertheoretically comparable. The authors delve into the complex problem of making intertheoretic comparisons, offering novel solutions and discussing the implications of their views for metaethics and practical ethics. This work provides a comprehensive overview and a new theoretical framework for anyone seeking a rigorous method for ethical decision-making when moral truths are not clear.
Other editions (2)
Listen to the summary Narrated summary
We often find ourselves adrift in a sea of moral questions, unsure how to navigate the complex currents of right and wrong. We grapple with how to weigh the cries of distant strangers against the needs of those near, or how to consider the ethical implications of bringing new life into existence. Though we possess all the empirical facts, a lingering uncertainty about what, morally, we ought to do persists. This is not a mere intellectual exercise; it is a profound challenge for anyone committed to acting ethically, acknowledging the inherent difficulty of moral reasoning.
While economists and philosophers have long explored decision-making under factual uncertainty, the realm of fundamental moral uncertainty has remained largely uncharted. It is here that a crucial gap exists, one that demands a framework for how we should proceed when our moral compass spins. Distinctive norms, it turns out, govern how one ought to make decisions in such predicaments, norms that are intimately tied to the very nature of our moral beliefs.
Consider a simple dining choice: foie gras or vegetarian risotto. You find both equally appealing, so prudential reasons offer no clear path. Yet, you hold a certain credence in the view that animal welfare carries no moral weight, while also acknowledging the plausibility of an anti-speciesist utilitarian perspective. How then do you choose? The simplistic approach of merely following the theory you are most confident in, often dubbed the "my favorite theory" strategy, appears inadequate. Instead, a more nuanced, information-sensitive account is required, one that draws a compelling analogy to social choice theory.
The path forward often involves maximizing "expected choiceworthiness." This means evaluating actions not just by how good they are according to one moral theory, but by considering how good they are across all plausible moral theories, weighted by the degree of confidence one places in each. However, the application of this principle depends critically on the nature of the moral views themselves. Are these theories merely ordinal, ranking actions without specifying the magnitude of difference? Are they cardinal, indicating how much better one option is than another? Or are they both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable, allowing for a direct comparison of choiceworthiness across different frameworks?
The challenge of making these "intertheoretic comparisons" is central to navigating moral uncertainty. It asks whether we can find a common scale or a principled way to compare the "choiceworthiness" assigned by vastly different moral perspectives. Various approaches are explored, including methods akin to voting rules, where the influence of different moral theories is somehow aggregated. One such proposal involves normalizing the scale of choiceworthiness within each theory so that their variance is equal, thereby granting each theory an equal "voice" in the final decision.
Taking moral uncertainty seriously has profound implications, stretching into both metaethics and practical ethics. Metaethically, it suggests a leaning towards cognitivism – the idea that moral judgments are beliefs capable of being true or false, rather than mere expressions of desire. Practically, it compels a degree of moral caution. Even if one is highly confident in a particular moral theory, if another plausible theory deems a certain action to be gravely wrong, one ought to proceed with extreme care. It is a call to move beyond unwavering conviction and embrace the complexity of our moral landscape, acknowledging that the wisest course of action often lies in a balanced consideration of diverse, even conflicting, moral perspectives.
While economists and philosophers have long explored decision-making under factual uncertainty, the realm of fundamental moral uncertainty has remained largely uncharted. It is here that a crucial gap exists, one that demands a framework for how we should proceed when our moral compass spins. Distinctive norms, it turns out, govern how one ought to make decisions in such predicaments, norms that are intimately tied to the very nature of our moral beliefs.
Consider a simple dining choice: foie gras or vegetarian risotto. You find both equally appealing, so prudential reasons offer no clear path. Yet, you hold a certain credence in the view that animal welfare carries no moral weight, while also acknowledging the plausibility of an anti-speciesist utilitarian perspective. How then do you choose? The simplistic approach of merely following the theory you are most confident in, often dubbed the "my favorite theory" strategy, appears inadequate. Instead, a more nuanced, information-sensitive account is required, one that draws a compelling analogy to social choice theory.
The path forward often involves maximizing "expected choiceworthiness." This means evaluating actions not just by how good they are according to one moral theory, but by considering how good they are across all plausible moral theories, weighted by the degree of confidence one places in each. However, the application of this principle depends critically on the nature of the moral views themselves. Are these theories merely ordinal, ranking actions without specifying the magnitude of difference? Are they cardinal, indicating how much better one option is than another? Or are they both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable, allowing for a direct comparison of choiceworthiness across different frameworks?
The challenge of making these "intertheoretic comparisons" is central to navigating moral uncertainty. It asks whether we can find a common scale or a principled way to compare the "choiceworthiness" assigned by vastly different moral perspectives. Various approaches are explored, including methods akin to voting rules, where the influence of different moral theories is somehow aggregated. One such proposal involves normalizing the scale of choiceworthiness within each theory so that their variance is equal, thereby granting each theory an equal "voice" in the final decision.
Taking moral uncertainty seriously has profound implications, stretching into both metaethics and practical ethics. Metaethically, it suggests a leaning towards cognitivism – the idea that moral judgments are beliefs capable of being true or false, rather than mere expressions of desire. Practically, it compels a degree of moral caution. Even if one is highly confident in a particular moral theory, if another plausible theory deems a certain action to be gravely wrong, one ought to proceed with extreme care. It is a call to move beyond unwavering conviction and embrace the complexity of our moral landscape, acknowledging that the wisest course of action often lies in a balanced consideration of diverse, even conflicting, moral perspectives.
What other readers say
Liked
The book receives widespread acclaim as an excellent, scrupulous, and comprehensive exploration of the crucial yet often overlooked subject of moral uncertainty. Reviewers consistently praise its clear articulation of why moral uncertainty constitutes a real and significant issue, effectively arguing for the necessity of acknowledging a degree of ethical doubt given the historical disagreements among moral philosophers. The authors are commended for developing robust frameworks and formal methodologies to guide decision-making when confronted with conflicting moral theories, drawing insightful parallels to social choice and voting theory. The work introduces key concepts such as maximizing expected choiceworthiness, the Borda rule, and variance voting. Furthermore, the book is lauded for its thorough examination of objections, its focus on the practical applicability of its methods, and its thought-provoking discussions on metaethical implications and the surprisingly high value of moral information, which can have substantial practical consequences for both personal and philanthropic choices. Many readers found the book to be a profound and valuable update to their ethical reasoning.
Disliked
Despite its strengths, several reviewers highlight the book's significant technical density and reliance on philosophical jargon, which can make it challenging for those without a solid background in moral philosophy or decision theory; some admitted to skimming the more complex sections. Reservations were also expressed regarding the direct analogy between moral and empirical uncertainty, particularly because the moral values of outcomes are not empirically observable, potentially complicating the process of rejecting one moral theory over another compared to scientific contexts. Concerns were raised about the practical demands of applying the proposed framework, with some finding its real-world implementation to be extremely complex. Additionally, a few reviewers felt that the authors' responses to certain objections, such as the exculpatory power of moral beliefs, were at times insubstantial, and noted that the sophisticated framework sometimes appeared to lead back to conclusions reminiscent of classical utilitarianism in intricate scenarios.
In short
Overall, this book is considered a highly significant and stimulating contribution to the field of ethics, pioneering an exciting area for ongoing research. While its technical depth presents a challenge, it is strongly recommended for anyone deeply engaged in rigorous ethical reasoning and the complexities of decision-making under uncertainty. It is particularly well-suited for students and professionals in philosophy, effective altruism, or decision theory who are prepared for a demanding read. Readers who are comfortable with philosophical terminology and enjoy exploring complex, formal approaches to ethical problems will find it an indispensable resource for advancing beyond simplistic ethical stances, even if they do not fully align with the authors' specific meta-ethical conclusions. However, those seeking a light, accessible introduction to ethics or straightforward practical advice for everyday moral dilemmas may find the material too dense and abstract.
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