Moral Uncertainty

We often find ourselves adrift in a sea of moral questions, unsure how to navigate the complex currents of right and wrong. We grapple with how to weigh the cries of distant strangers against the needs of those near, or how to consider the ethical implications of bringing new life into existence. Though we possess all the empirical facts, a lingering uncertainty about what, morally, we ought to do persists. This is not a mere intellectual exercise; it is a profound challenge for anyone committed to acting ethically, acknowledging the inherent difficulty of moral reasoning.

While economists and philosophers have long explored decision-making under factual uncertainty, the realm of fundamental moral uncertainty has remained largely uncharted. It is here that a crucial gap exists, one that demands a framework for how we should proceed when our moral compass spins. Distinctive norms, it turns out, govern how one ought to make decisions in such predicaments, norms that are intimately tied to the very nature of our moral beliefs.

Consider a simple dining choice: foie gras or vegetarian risotto. You find both equally appealing, so prudential reasons offer no clear path. Yet, you hold a certain credence in the view that animal welfare carries no moral weight, while also acknowledging the plausibility of an anti-speciesist utilitarian perspective. How then do you choose? The simplistic approach of merely following the theory you are most confident in, often dubbed the "my favorite theory" strategy, appears inadequate. Instead, a more nuanced, information-sensitive account is required, one that draws a compelling analogy to social choice theory.

The path forward often involves maximizing "expected choiceworthiness." This means evaluating actions not just by how good they are according to one moral theory, but by considering how good they are across all plausible moral theories, weighted by the degree of confidence one places in each. However, the application of this principle depends critically on the nature of the moral views themselves. Are these theories merely ordinal, ranking actions without specifying the magnitude of difference? Are they cardinal, indicating how much better one option is than another? Or are they both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable, allowing for a direct comparison of choiceworthiness across different frameworks?

The challenge of making these "intertheoretic comparisons" is central to navigating moral uncertainty. It asks whether we can find a common scale or a principled way to compare the "choiceworthiness" assigned by vastly different moral perspectives. Various approaches are explored, including methods akin to voting rules, where the influence of different moral theories is somehow aggregated. One such proposal involves normalizing the scale of choiceworthiness within each theory so that their variance is equal, thereby granting each theory an equal "voice" in the final decision.

Taking moral uncertainty seriously has profound implications, stretching into both metaethics and practical ethics. Metaethically, it suggests a leaning towards cognitivism – the idea that moral judgments are beliefs capable of being true or false, rather than mere expressions of desire. Practically, it compels a degree of moral caution. Even if one is highly confident in a particular moral theory, if another plausible theory deems a certain action to be gravely wrong, one ought to proceed with extreme care. It is a call to move beyond unwavering conviction and embrace the complexity of our moral landscape, acknowledging that the wisest course of action often lies in a balanced consideration of diverse, even conflicting, moral perspectives.